Gao et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 101, 208901 (2008)] have described a possible intercept-resend attack for the quantum protocol for detectable Byzantine agreement in Phys. Rev. Lett. 100, 070504 (2008). Here we describe an extension of the protocol which defeats such attacks.
PACS numbers: 03.67. Hk, 03.67.Pp, 42.50.Dv Recently [1], Gao et al. have pointed out that there exists an intercept-resend attack for the quantum protocol for detectable Byzantine agreement described in [2] . Here we describe how such attacks alter the entanglement of the distributed multipartite state and thus can be revealed by further analysis of the acquired data.
The protocol uses the four-photon state
to distribute lists securely to three parties which then enable them to achieve the detectable Byzantine agreement. In [2], step (iii) stated: "C randomly chooses a position from his list and asks A and B to inform him about their results on the same position. If all parties have measured in the same basis, their results must be suitably correlated." In the attack proposed in [1], the traitor intercepts the qubits sent to one of the loyal generals and performs measurements on them. These measurements are single-qubit measurements in the {|0 , |1 } basis of eigenstates of the Pauli matrix σ z or in the {|0 , |1 } basis [where |0 = (|0 +|1 )/ √ 2 and |1 = (|0 −|1 )/ √ 2] of eigenstates of the Pauli matrix σ x . Then, the traitor resends the qubits in the state resulting from the previous measurements to the loyal general. With this method, the traitor can obtain the other generals' secret lists which he can use to mislead the loyal generals into following different plans.
Since the roles of B and C in the protocol in [2] are symmetrical, there are only three cases to be dealt with:
(I) A (the commanding general) is the traitor and intercepts, measures, and resends the qubit sent to B (qubit c).
(II) B is the traitor and intercepts, measures, and resends the two qubits sent to A (qubits a and b). * Electronic address: adan@us.es (III) B is the traitor and intercepts, measures, and resends the qubit sent to C (qubit d).
These attacks indeed do not alter the perfect correlations utilized in the protocol so far. However, they obviously change the entanglement of the four photon state and thus the correlations between the results if the parties measured along different directions. This can be used to detect the attack. There are several ways to foil these attacks. Here we present a simple method which does not require additional measurements and in which the traitor does not need to announce his actual results. In the following, we present an example of the method for each of the three cases.
(I) Suppose that A is the traitor and intercepts and measures the qubit sent to B in the basis of eigenstates of σ z . In half of the cases, A obtains the result corresponding to |0 c and resends the state |0 c to B. Therefore, in these cases the state of the four qubits is
In the other half of the cases, A obtains the result corresponding to |1 c and resends B the state |1 c . Therefore, in these cases the state of the four qubits is
Therefore, after A's attack, the state of the four qubits is the mixed state
Suppose that B and C measure their qubits in the basis of eigenstates of σ x . Then, C asks A and B for their results. When C checks them, C expects that σ (c)
, which is the prediction for the state |Ψ 
